A Critical Look at Ghana's 24 Hour Economy Policy

Ghana’s 24-hour economy policy is ambitious, but gaps in planning, funding, and continuity threaten its success. Without stronger systems and follow-through, it risks becoming another missed opportunity.

Ghana’s new 24-hour economy programme is being pitched as a national transformation agenda to boost productivity around the clock, create decent jobs, drive industrialisation, promote exports, and foster self reliance through inclusive growth. On paper it is a comprehensive blueprint that touches every sector of the economy. It integrates agriculture, industry, finance, skills, logistics, and even public sector reform in one plan. The idea is not merely to extend business hours, but to remove structural bottlenecks so that economic activity can flow continuously day and night.

The policy bundles together eight sub-programmes with catchy names like Grow24 for agriculture and food security, Make24 for manufacturing, Build24 for infrastructure, Show24 for tourism and the creative industries, Connect24 for logistics, Fund24 for finance, Aspire24 for education and skills, and Go24 for governance. In essence, it’s an all-hands-on-deck approach – from farms and factories to schools and ministries – to energize Ghana’s economy 24/7. For example, under Grow24 the government talks of turning the Volta Basin into a new breadbasket for year-round farming, while Make24 envisions 50 new industrial parks positioning Ghana as the factory hub of West Africa. In tandem, Build24 would provide the roads, energy and industrial zones to support these ventures, and Connect24 would fix supply chain inefficiencies through measures like air cargo hubs and cold storage networks.

Aspire24 seeks to align education and skills training with industry needs so that the workforce is ready for this ambitious shift, and Go24 aims to nudge government agencies (from municipal offices to the police) to offer services beyond the usual 8-to-5. It’s an expansive vision, rounded out with specific flagship projects – such as a new machinery and technology park in Kumasi, a pharmaceutical manufacturing park at Legon, a textile and garment enclave at Juapong, and digital centres for technical training in every region. There is even a “Ghana 24/7 Readiness Programme” to train over 5,000 small businesses and help 50 larger firms pilot 24/7 production shifts as a proof of concept.

Pull Factors and Promises

The government is offering plenty of incentives to encourage firms to sign onto the 24H agenda. Companies in strategic sectors will enjoy tax breaks and regulatory perks if they agree to operate longer hours. For instance, businesses that run a second production shift can get a 25% corporate tax rebate, and those running three shifts (i.e. 24-hour operations) qualify for a 50% tax rebate. Certain priority sectors like grains, vegetables, and other staple foods are to be completely exempt from corporate income tax to spur investment. Firms that participate also won’t pay import duties on machinery, raw materials, and renewable energy equipment needed for expansion.

To tackle costs, companies operating between 10pm and 6am will benefit from discounted electricity tariffs to make night-time work more affordable. And to smooth the way, the policy promises fast-tracked access to utilities and permits – things like quicker electricity connections and priority regulatory approvals for participating businesses. Alongside these carrots, the programme plans to set up a new Strategic Value Chain Development Fund funded partly by a levy on certain imported goods that Ghana can produce locally. The idea there is to reduce imports (by making them a bit more expensive) and use that money to support local producers in those same industries.

All these measures are designed to make it lucrative and convenient for companies to produce more, create jobs, and boost exports under a 24-hour model. However, they also mean the government forgoing some revenue (through tax cuts) and imposing new import taxes, steps which will require legal changes and careful calibration. It’s a bold mix of incentives, but the real test is whether they’ll be enough to change business behavior at scale.

The Implementation Question 

The frustration among analysts is that while the package sounds new and bold, the core vision isn’t radically different from what Ghana has been trying to achieve for decades. Successive governments have acknowledged the same fundamental issues: our economy relies too much on exporting raw commodities with little value added, and we need to industrialize and modernize agriculture to change that.

These truths were central to the previous administration’s Ghana Beyond Aid agenda and the Coordinated Program for Economic and Social Development (2017–2024). In fact, much of the 24-hour economy document’s diagnosis aligns with those earlier plans. We’ve known we need an agricultural revolution and a shift to value-added industry for a long time. It’s practically in every national development plan going back to the 1970s. The 24H policy repackages this consensus with a fresh label and some new twists, but it stands on familiar ground.

The question is, will this plan finally see sustained action where previous ones did not? In practice, Ghana’s bigger problem has been less about designing good policies and more about sticking with them long enough to see results.

A major concern is continuity. The 24-hour economy programme is the brainchild of the current government, but what happens if there’s a change of administration in the future? The current 4-hour economy document doesn’t clearly explain how it builds on recent initiatives like One District, One Factory (1D1F) or Planting for Food and Jobs – flagship projects of the last government that share similar aims. Ideally, a new policy of this magnitude would acknowledge and incorporate the lessons from those programs, to show it is a continuation of Ghana’s development agenda.

Unfortunately, Ghana has a habit of each government junking or rebranding the previous one’s projects, leading to a cycle of “start-stop” development. The 24H policy should be structured to survive political transitions. Tying it into existing national institutions and making it part of their core mandate (rather than a standalone pet project) might help.

Interestingly, while we often drop our own home-grown plans, we rarely drop IMF programs even when governments change. The implication is that continuity can be achieved when there’s a binding framework. The drafters of the 24H policy seem aware of this risk: the plan is expected to be backed by a new law to institutionalize it, and even calls for an authority chaired by the President to steer it. However, creating a whole new “Authority” might not be the best approach. It could inadvertently introduce another bureaucratic layer without solving the fundamental issue of seeing policies through.

A case in point: the National Health Insurance Authority reportedly spends around 44% of its funds on administration alone, undermining its ability to pay claims on time. The fear is that if we establish a 24H Economy Authority, it could become a costly white elephant – another office with SUVs and salaries draining funds, rather than channeling resources to actual projects.

Moreover, implementation is a major concern across the board. Ghana has no shortage of well-written plans; the challenge has always been executing them effectively.

Instead of a new structure, the programme should leverage existing ministries, departments and local government structures to implement the 24H agenda. If the policy’s initiatives are woven into the work of established institutions it is more likely to endure. This approach would also minimize duplication and save costs, making it easier to keep the programme going even if leadership changes.

Additionally, the plan’s accountability and measurement framework appears weak. It sets lofty targets (for instance, it mentions an aim to create about 1.7 million jobs in four years), but it provides few details on how progress towards those targets will be tracked year by year. There is a mention of 2028 as a horizon for some goals, but little in terms of phased benchmarks or Key Performance Indicators in between. Six months or a year from now, how will we know if we’re on track? The document is short on specifics about data collection, reporting timelines, and who is accountable for meeting interim goals.

By contrast, IMF programmes that Ghana undertakes are very explicit on quarterly reviews and performance criteria. Those external checks compel the government to sit up and deliver (or face consequences). With a domestic initiative like this, the fear is that without built-in reviews and public progress reports, the momentum could fade and there’s no external referee to call foul. If the 24H economy is to work, it would benefit from a clear monitoring and evaluation plan: e.g., targets for each pillar every six or twelve months, transparent reporting on achievements and shortfalls, and adjustments made along the way. As it stands, the policy’s credibility suffers from the absence of “the numbers” behind the vision – even the promised benefits (like job creation or export growth) are not backed by concrete projections and data. This lack of clarity makes it hard for the public and investors to fully buy in.

Meanwhile, the programme’s price tag and financing raise many questions. The government estimates the initial cost at about $4 billion. Out of this, only $300 million (roughly 7-8%) is to come directly from the government as seed money. The plan is to leverage the remaining 92% – which is around $3.7 billion – through public-private partnerships and investments facilitated by the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF). To boost the pot, a new 2.5% import levy will be slapped on a range of goods that Ghana could produce domestically (things like processed foods, cosmetics, diapers, certain plastics, etc.), and that revenue will flow into the development fund for this programme. The intentions here are twofold: discourage imports of those items and raise money to invest in local capacity. Even so, many are skeptical that $4 billion is anywhere near enough to achieve the sweeping goals of the 24H economy plan.

For perspective, the previous government’s promised “Big Push” infrastructure drive alone was estimated at $10 billion. And after the COVID-19 shock, Ghana’s economic recovery plan (the Ghana CARES programme) was touted at a massive GH¢100 billion – about $15 billion at the time – with the assumption that 70% of that would come from the private sector. Against those figures, $4 billion feels quite modest for an effort that aims to overhaul virtually every sector. It might be that the $4 billion is just a start or covers only a first phase, but the document doesn’t spell that out. Additionally, relying on the GIIF and other PPP arrangements brings its own risks.

Ghana’s track record with flashy PPP projects is not the best – one often-cited example is the much-hyped Accra SkyTrain project that never materialised, despite involvement of the GIIF and other partners. The fear is that the 24H economy could end up in the same “PPP graveyard” if the financing doesn’t come through as expected. The policy also directs some existing funding sources to this agenda, such as allocating ₵148 million from the District Assemblies Common Fund in 2025 to set up 24-hour markets. That idea – essentially creating or upgrading markets to operate at night – has drawn some skepticism. Is it a visionary move to stimulate commerce after dark, or just a gimmicky project to show quick results before the next election? Critics worry it might be more of a branding exercise (“night markets”) that doesn’t address deeper issues. In short, the financing plan, while creative, may be optimistic and needs much more fleshing out to convince observers that the money will be available and well-used.

In practice, there’s also the question of how smoothly Ghanaian businesses and workers can transition to a true 24-hour economy. It’s one thing for the government to declare extended hours and dangle incentives; it’s another for factories, shops, and offices to fundamentally change how they operate. Some skeptics argue that unless the general business environment is attractive, targeted incentives might not be enough to get companies to run overnight shifts. For example, if a firm faces high costs due to poor infrastructure or has to hire three people to do a job one person could do in a more efficient setting, then a tax rebate might not tip the scale for them.

The 24H policy does recognize that logistics and infrastructure are key – it notes that supply chain inefficiencies dramatically inflate costs in Ghana. So improving roads, transportation and power reliability (which Build24 and Connect24 aim to do) is crucial to make round-the-clock operations viable. But beyond infrastructure, there’s a cultural and practical dimension. Not every service can or should run 24/7; demand may not justify it, or safety might be an issue at 2am in some locations. We’ve already seen some early experiments: for instance, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) extended service hours in a pilot program. Yet, there was an anecdote of a citizen who went to a DVLA office at night and was told their request couldn’t be processed due to “internet issues” at that hour. Whether or not that story is representative, it illustrates that simply keeping the lights on doesn’t guarantee productivity – you need the whole system (from tech infrastructure to staffing and support services like security) working reliably.

Likewise, a senior police officer’s comment about creating a special 24-hour policing secretariat was met with bemusement, since the police already operate 24/7 by nature. The takeaway is that implementing a 24-hour economy will involve a lot of learning and adjustments on the ground. Companies will weigh the extra costs of night operations against the incentives. Workers will have to be available in shifts, which raises questions about labor regulations and even social adjustments. These practical aspects will determine whether the idea truly takes hold beyond a few showcase projects.

More broadly, even the skeptics acknowledge that the goals of the 24-hour economy policy are worthy. Ghana does need to boost production, create jobs, and become more competitive globally. The economy has struggled with the same structural problems for too long, and doing business as usual will not magically solve them. In that sense, the 24H programme is a proactive attempt to shake things up. It’s encouraging that the plan is comprehensive and tries to tackle multiple angles at once (from farming inputs to financing to skills training) – because piecemeal efforts in isolation haven’t had enough impact. The emphasis on inclusive growth and “decent jobs” shows it’s not just growth for growth’s sake, but trying to ensure ordinary Ghanaians see benefits around the clock. Yet, a healthy dose of realism is needed.

This policy is not a silver bullet, and it shouldn’t be sold as one. It will take steadfast implementation over many years, likely well beyond the current government’s term, for the vision to materialize. There are internal contradictions to navigate as well (for example, offering big tax cuts to stimulate industry could conflict with the need to raise revenue for infrastructure – a balance must be struck). What citizens should watch for in the coming months is how the government begins to put this plan into action. Will laws and regulations to enable the incentives be passed swiftly? Will the promised projects like industrial parks and agro-processing zones break ground on schedule? How transparently will the funding (like the import levy and any budget allocations) be managed? Early signs of serious implementation will build confidence. If instead the plan languishes in buzzwords and committees, it will join a shelf of prior strategies that never lived up to their billing.

The 24-hour economy idea is audacious and has some well-thought-out components, but Ghanaians have heard grand pronouncements before. Now it’s all about execution, consistency, and political will. The potential is there for it to nudge Ghana towards a more self-reliant, dynamic economy that works for people at all hours – but only if we confront the real challenges head-on and keep the effort beyond the usual political cycle. In the end, a critical but hopeful eye is warranted: this could be a turning point if managed wisely, or just another plan on paper if not. The coming years will reveal which it will be.